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Abstract 
Malaria causes close to half a million deaths per year, the majority of which are in children under 
five years of age who live in sub-Saharan Africa.  Despite significant progress in reducing 
malaria deaths in the past fifteen years, there is still a long way to go before universal coverage 
with key interventions like LLINs and IRS is reached, which is an essential step towards 
achieving malaria elimination.  While severe resource constraints pose a fundamental 
challenge, growing resistance to insecticides used in LLIN and for IRS exacerbates this issue, 
and threatens to undermine the significant gains achieved to date.  This IPPI Policy Brief draws 
from economic theory to analyse the case of insecticide resistance.  It highlights some 
fundamental trade-offs brought about by the emergence of resistance to insecticides, as well 
as the lack of data that is necessary to analyse them.  The paper also explores how the concept 
of market failure is applied in the field of malaria control, and where market inefficiencies have 
not yet been adequately addressed.  Overall, while there is no doubt that significant additional 
funding is needed to combat malaria and hopefully to move closer to its elimination, there is an 
urgent need to use sound economic analysis to help develop and strengthen a global rationale 
for further public investment in malaria vector control and to better take account of insecticide 
resistance in the prioritisation and deployment of national, in-country programmes. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
While there has been substantial progress in scaling up malaria control in the past few years, 
most malaria endemic countries have still to reach universal coverage of low cost high impact 
malaria prevention, diagnosis and treatment interventions.  The gains made to date in reducing 
malaria cases and deaths are potentially fragile for a number of reasons.  Despite a significant 
increase in malaria financing in the past ten to fifteen years, severely constrained health budgets 
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and ever-increasing competition for scarce resources have meant that financing falls short of 
the total needed to render universal coverage possible, and thus pave the way for eradication.  
Malaria financing across developing countries, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa is still 
heavily reliant on external donor financing, and with domestic financing, raises important 
questions around the sustainability of existing programmes. 
Amongst other important challenges, resistance to insecticides used in malaria control has been 
growing rapidly and poses a huge challenge to the global health community.  Though there has 
not yet been widespread failure of public health insecticides [1], failing to tackle resistance 
urgently has potentially disastrous consequences [2], and experts argue that three new classes 
of public health insecticides are necessary to do so effectively [3].  To this aim the innovative 
vector control consortium (IVCC) was set up ten years ago to develop new public health 
insecticides to combat malaria.  Initially set up with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF), it is now supported by other donors including UKAID, USAID and the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation, and has led to significant progress in the global 
effort to combat resistance, several new and reformulated insecticide products are in the final 
stages of development. 
However, the knowledge base on the economics of vector control in an era of resistance to 
insecticides is relatively scarce, particularly as far as new classes of insecticides are concerned.  
An overall framework for analysing the advent of resistance and its potential economic 
consequences is lacking.  The aim of this policy brief is to propose some first steps towards 
developing such a framework.  In doing so, the authors hope not only to contribute towards 
global advocacy efforts to combat malaria, but also lay the foundations for a more systematic 
and comprehensive approach to resource allocation decision-making for malaria control in an 
era of resistance.  
The paper will start by presenting an overview of malaria and its recent history in section two.  
Section three discusses the issue of insecticide resistance in more detail, including some of the 
additional challenges it brings about and ways in which it can be addressed.  Critically, this 
section presents some fundamental trade-offs brought about by resistance, which need to be 
analysed more systematically and explicitly in the resource allocation process.  In doing so, it 
also highlights some major data gaps in modelling resistance and the costs associated with 
managing it effectively.  The fourth section introduces some key economic concepts which are 
used to analyse the problem of vector control and insecticide resistance in particular.  Some 
examples of market failure in the area of malaria vector control which carry important 
consequences for policy decisions are discussed.  Critically, we seek to demonstrate that the 
existence of certain types of market failure in particular provides a strong case for public 
intervention.  We conclude in section five by proposing four components of a broader framework 
to facilitate decision making for vector control in an era of resistance, includi
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the global community may think about moving forward to build a stronger investment case for 
malaria vector control in an era of resistance.      
2. Recent history of malaria 
Malaria is caused by the Plasmodium parasite, which can be spread to humans through the 
bites of infected female Anopheles mosquitoes.  There are five types of plasmodium parasites 
that can potentially cause malaria in humans, two of which are currently considered major public 
health challenges, Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax. 
Despite being an entirely preventable and treatable disease, 214 million new cases of malaria 
and 438 000 deaths occurred in 2015 [1].  About 3.2 billion people remain at risk of malaria, 
and the majority of cases occur in sub-Saharan Africa in children under five years of age.  The 
disease disproportionately affects the poor and disadvantaged for whom the cost of treatment 
is often unaffordable, placing a huge strain on individuals, families, and society.  Though often 
un-reported, there is also a significant socio-economic impact of lost productivity from prolonged 
and/or repeated illness [4].  
In the past fifteen years, the international community has begun responding to this global health 
crisis with a dramatic expansion of prevention, treatment and diagnostic interventions, which 
have resulted in a significant reduction in malaria deaths and incidence rates worldwide.  WHO 
estimates that between 2000 and 2015, the number of malaria cases globally decreased from 
262 to 214 million, while deaths from malaria fell by 60% across all age groups, from an 
estimated 839 000 to 438 000 per year.  The proportion of children infected with malaria 
parasites has been halved in endemic areas of Africa since 2000 [1]. 
The large scale up of two highly cost-effective vector control interventions, namely indoor 
residual spraying (IRS) and insecticide treated nets (ITNs) has been a major contributor to this 
progress.  WHO estimates that 49% of the population at risk in sub-Saharan Africa had access 
to an ITN in their household in 2013 (compared with 3% in 2004), while 44% were sleeping 
under a net (compared to 2% in 2004) [1].  Figure 1 below compares the dramatic increase in 
the number of people sleeping under a net since 2000 with the fall in the malaria incidence rate 
due to Plasmodium falciparum for all African countries where malaria is endemic.  Despite a 
lack of reliable surveillance and other data to measure with certainty the impact of ITNs and 
IRS across different settings in Africa, a recent study has estimated that mass distribution of 
ITNs has indeed played a major role in reducing incidence of P falciparum in Africa [5].  Using 
a large database of malaria field surveys and linking it to detailed reconstructions of changes in 
intervention coverage, the study estimates that out of an average of 663 million clinical cases 
averted since 2000, 68% and 10% were due to ITNs and IRS respectively [5].  Thus the authors 
argue that ³LQFUHDVLQJ DFFHVV WR SRWHQWLDOO\ Oife-saving vector control interventions and 
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maintaining their effectiveness in the face of insecticide and drug resistance, should form a 
cornerstone of post-FRQWUROVWUDWHJLHV´  
 
 
 
Over the years, malaria control interventions have been shown to be highly cost effective [6, 7] 
and to yield a high return on investment in public health [8].  Cost per DALY results seen for the 
distribution of bednets in particular have been comparable to those obtained for administering 
traditional vaccines, and have tended to be consistently more favourable than those for 
interventions to combat HIV and TB [9, 10]1.  Furthermore, WHO estimates that reductions in 
malaria case incidence attributable to malaria control activities are estimated to have saved 
                                                          
1
 While cost per DALY averted has been estimated around $27 (range 8.15-110) and $143 (range 135-150) for ITNs 
and IRS respectively, the cost per DALY for traditional expanded immunization programmes (EPI) has ranged from 
$7-$438 per DALY. Meanwhile, results for HIV tend to vary from $0 to infinity, with the majority of results lying above 
the $150 per DALY benchmark, including most studies which look at anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for mother-to-child 
prevention. Although the results for TB are complicated by a number of factors, the cost of treating TB (party as a 
preventive measure) varied from $5 to $50 per DALY. This means that in a country with a high burden of malaria, 
effective malaria control is likely to be one of the best health sector investments that can be made. 
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about US$ 900 million on the malaria case management costs in sub-Saharan Africa between 
2001 and 2014 [1]. 
Despite these huge advances, however, there is still a long way to go before universal coverage 
of malaria prevention is reached, eventually paving the road for malaria elimination, as 
advocated by the WHO General Technical Strategy for Malaria [8].  One fundamental challenge 
to achieving these goals is the lack of domestic and international financing.  Although global 
financing for malaria control increased from around US$ 960 million in 2005 to US$ 2.5 billion 
in 2014, this amount represents less than half of the total amount needed to achieve targets for 
malaria control and elimination set out in the Global Technical Strategy for Malaria [1].  
Worryingly, contributions have grown at a slower pace in recent years, reducing by 8% between 
2013 and 2014.  With a view to reducing the existing and projected financing gap, WHO has 
been advocating that malaria endemic countries and donor countries give a higher priority to 
investments in malaria control. 
)XUWKHUPRUH ZKLOH WKH JDLQV DFKLHYHG DUH VDLG WR EH ³IUDJLOH DQG XQHYHQO\ GLVWULEXWHG´ [8], 
another major factor which threatens to severely undermine current efforts and even reverse 
the gains achieved to date, is the occurrence of insecticide resistance to malaria vector control.  
3. Insecticide resistance 
The rapid scale up of malaria vector control intervention has proved to be a powerful and 
effective tool to control this potentially deadly disease, yet it has also had some severe 
unintended negative consequences.  As a result of intensified control efforts, the selection 
pressure on mosquitoes to develop resistance to insecticides used in malaria control has 
increased dramatically in recent years, and continues to spread rapidly [11].  Mosquito 
resistance to one or more of the four classes of insecticides currently approved by WHO has 
been identified in at least 60 malaria-endemic countries worldwide [1].  Resistance continues to 
spread not only across territories, but also across mosquito species, and in certain cases, fully 
susceptible mosquito populations are becoming the exception rather than the norm [11]. 
The problem is particularly severe in the case of ITNs for which only one class of insecticide, 
the pyrethroids, has been approved for use.  In IRS there are more insecticide classes approved 
for use, however most non-pyrethroids are more expensive or raise other concerns (e.g. 
environmental impact of DDT) which have made them less attractive to policy makers, 
implementers and communities in some settings.  There are also growing concerns over some 
mosquito populations which have shown resistance to all four classes of insecticides available 
for malaria control [11].  
The rapid spread of vector resistance to insecticides threatens not only to halt but even reverse 
the gains recently achieved in malaria vector control [12].  In some countries which have 
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identified and begun to tackle resistance, coverage with IRS has decreased due to use of more 
costly non-pyrethroid insecticides [12].  Meanwhile, in other countries where resistance is 
prevalent, pyrethroids are still being used as a single/main insecticide as a result of prohibitive 
costs of alternative insecticides and limited information on resistance management strategies 
[12].  This is likely to reduce the effectiveness of IRS.  Pyrethroids are the only insecticide class 
currently approved for use on bednets, meaning that pyrethroid resistance threatens to 
undermine the public health (transmission reducing) impact of ITNs.  
While it is difficult to measure the impact of resistance on the effectiveness of malaria control, 
WHO and other experts agree there is an urgent need to manage resistance effectively, to avoid 
reaching a situation where there would be widespread control failure [12].  To this end, WHO 
has developed a strategy for combating resistance to insecticides, where high priority is given 
to preserving the susceptibility of major malaria vectors to pyrethroids and other classes of 
insecticides, and countries are encouraged to implement insecticide resistance management 
(IRM) strategies where appropriate [12].  The document also notes that short term investment 
in more expensive IRM strategies is likely to result in longer term cost savings due to extended 
use of less expensive insecticides.  
In this context, some countries have begun to develop and implement insecticide resistance 
management (IRM) strategies, as a short and medium term solution while new vector control 
tools are being developed.  Current options for IRM are limited but include use of non-pyrethroid 
IRS and larval source management in combination with standard LLINs.  Combination LLINs 
may also be used as a stop-gap measure while innovative insecticides and new approaches to 
vector control are developed.   
To develop and implement IRM strategies effectively, entomological data concerning each 
major species should be collected across different settings regularly, in order to track changes 
over time and follow the most appropriate course of action.  Nevertheless, despite the huge 
investments in ITNs and IRS, many countries do not conduct routine malaria vector 
surveillance, including for insecticide resistance. According to WHO, among the 97 countries 
that reported adopting policies for vector control with ITNs or IRS, only 52 reported resistance 
data for 2014 [1].  
The lack of adequate entomological data further exacerbates the challenges posed by the 
existence of a tipping point, where resistance occurs at a low but gradually increasing level for 
a number of years, without necessarily being detected.  When the tipping point is reached, 
resistance suddenly increases rapidly and leads to control failure, leaving a limited timeframe 
within which to act to avoid disastrous consequences.  This occurred in Mexico, for example, 
where the frequency of resistance was very low at most sentinel sites between 2000 and 2003.  
However at some point between 2003 and 2007, resistance suddenly began to increase rapidly 
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and reached a frequency greater than 80% by 2007.  Evidence is building that a number of 
countries are rapidly approaching a tipping point, and that urgent action is needed [13]. 
Growing resistance to insecticides for malaria vector control poses major economic and other 
challenges for policy making at global and national levels, particularly as universal coverage to 
improve overall population health remains the overarching goal in malaria vector control [1].  
Resistance is likely to put even more pressure on already weak health systems and challenge 
the financial feasibility of malaria elimination, meaning that more resources are needed for 
malaria control.  While new vector control tools are currently being developed that could 
potentially be effective in tackling resistance and preserving or prolonging susceptibility to 
insecticides, intense competition for resources and constrained health budgets in general, and 
for malaria control specifically, mean options in reality are limited.   
Policy makers will face a difficult time trade-off between coverage, efficacy and cost as 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.  
Figure 2 shows the coverage efficacy trade-off forced on policy makers acting under a budget 
constraint. There is growing evidence of increasing resistance (lower efficacy), leading to 
reduced programme effectiveness. In some cases, where resistance has been identified and 
policy makers have begun to invest in tackling it, malaria programmes have opted for 
alternative, more expensive insecticides and lower coverage [14].  While efficacy of alternative 
insecticide is higher than that of pyrethroid, it is unlikely to be 100%, particularly in the medium 
and long term, as resistance to these alternatives is likely to develop.  Similarly, attaining 100% 
coverage is hardly achievable due to a range of challenges, including reaching some of the 
more remote communities in Africa, as well as ensuring adequate utilisation of bednets [1]. 
Significant additional investment will be necessary to ensure a high coverage can be achieved 
at the same time as high efficacy. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the trade-off is complicated by alternative strategies for deployment 
of multiple insecticides (with different modes of action) and the existence of a tipping point. 
Three insecticides could either be deployed in combination or sequentially, and the area under 
the curve for each strategy corresponds to the amount of protective efficacy gained. 
Theoretically, the combination strategy maintains full efficacy over the course of the 
programme. While this approach may cost more in the short run, it should result in long term 
cost savings and efficacy gain [12], avoiding the expense of developing additional new 
insecticides. 
Although figures 2 and 3 show theoretical trade-offs and the potential impact of insecticide 
resistance over time on programme effectiveness, one fundamental challenge is that we lack 
data to try and plot what the real trade-offs might look like in practice, including in terms of 
financial implications.  Further modelling that takes account of resistance and its potential path 
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over time, combined with decision tools that are appropriate for each context are necessary to 
support policy makers in resource allocation decisions to address the challenge of insecticide 
resistance, particularly in view of the limited time that may be available and severely constrained 
budgets.  
 
 
Figure 2: Coverage-efficacy trade-off under a budget constraint
Coverage
80%
Option C
50% 80% 100% Efficacy
Source: authors
100%
Option A Option B
Legend: B1 Initial budget sufficient to support either A (100% coverage, 50% efficacy) or B (80% 
coverage, 80% efficacy). Option C (100% coverage, 100% efficacy) possible only with higher 
budget B2. 
B1
B2
Additional 
budget 
required
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4. Vector control and market failure 
There are numerous failures in the market for vector control and IRM (Table 1).  While a number 
of market failures are already being tackled on a global scale, the rising problem of insecticide 
resistance, an externality of large scale ITN distribution programme in the last few years, poses 
fresh challenges that are only being partially addressed by public policy.  
Figure 3: Sequential versus combined use of different insecticides
Efficacy
X Y Z
Time (years)
Source: authors
Sequential use of 
single insecticides
Legend: Solid line shows efficacy of sequential use of single insecticides. Initially high efficacy 
declines slowly at first, then reaches a tipping point where it declines steeply. Efficacy is regained 
by switch to alternative insecticide at time X. The process is repeated at time Y and Z when 
potentially a forth new insecticide is required, entailing high research and development costs. 
Dashed line shows theoretical efficacy of a combination of three insecticides with different modes 
of action used as part of a pro-active resistance management approach. In this strategy, efficacy is 
maintained for the lifetime of the programme.
Lifetime of a malaria vector 
control program
Multiple insecticides 
used in combination
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Table 1.  Market failures in vector control (VC) and insecticide resistance management (IRM) 
Market Failure Definition Example in VC and/or IRM Addressed by public policy? 
Missing markets 
Markets may fail to form, resulting in a failure 
to meet a need or want, such as the need 
for public goods. 
Public goods or services, if they are provided 
at all, are open to use by all members of 
society.  As such, they are non-excludable 
and non-rivalrous in that individuals cannot 
be effectively excluded from use and where 
use by one individual does not reduce 
availability to others. 
VC: The vector killing effect of insecticides used in IRS 
and LLIN 
 
IRM: The effect of reducing the spread of resistance and 
thereby prolonging susceptibility to insecticide (if this is 
done for one setting/country, other settings/countries 
benefit too, as mosquitoes do not recognize borders).  
This leads to limited demand for vector control products, 
particularly more expensive, innovative products.  In turn, 
unless there is public intervention, there is limited 
research. 
Yes via free (sometimes targeted, donor 
funded) distribution of LLIN and IRS 
Partially via funding for product 
development partnerships (PDP) such as 
IVCC 
 
However, action to stimulate the demand 
for new products remains inadequate 
Incomplete 
markets 
Markets may fail to produce enough merit 
goods, which are goods where public benefit 
is greater than private benefit.  Without 
intervention, this leads to under-
consumption. 
As above As above 
Negative 
externality 
 
Negative effect from an activity which does 
not accrue to the person carrying it out. Resistance as an externality of vector control 
Partially by encouraging countries to 
strengthen surveillance systems and 
implement IRM strategies where 
necessary.  However funding is still 
lacking for this, and many countries are 
still over-using single insecticides. 
 
Limited action has been taken on a global 
scale to stimulate demand for new (more 
expensive) insecticides 
Positive 
externality 
Positive effect from an activity which does 
not accrue to the person carrying it out. 
VC: Benefits of an individual sleeping under a bednet 
accrues not only to him/her but also to other members of 
the community 
 
IRM: Benefits of one setting/country implementing IRM 
strategy benefits neighbouring settings/countries 
Partially through promoting multi-country 
action to combat resistance.  However 
limited funds and lack of adequate 
coordination mechanisms have stifled 
steady progress 
Non-competitive 
markets 
A market where there are a limited number 
of sellers. 
Limited number of manufacturers of (innovative) vector 
control products used to manage resistance means that 
product prices remain extremely high. 
Despite encouraging PDP for innovative 
vector control products, limited action has 
been taken to ensure end products can be 
made affordable to their users. 
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Information 
asymmetry 
Decisions in transactions where one party 
has more or better information than the 
other, which creates an imbalance of power. 
6HHEHORZXQGHU³SULQFLSDO-DJHQWSUREOHP´  
Principal-agent 
problem 
Arises where the two parties have different 
interests and asymmetric information (the 
agent having more information), such that 
the principal cannot directly ensure that the 
agent is always acting in the principal's best 
interests, particularly when activities that are 
useful to the principal are costly to the agent, 
and where elements of what the agent does 
are costly for the principal to observe. 
  
Policy makers in developing countries (the agents) make 
decisions on behalf of the population, or voters (the 
principal).  Faced with a limited budget and given 
pressure to secure votes, governments may have a 
disincentive to reduce coverage in favour of more 
effective products, to which resistance is less likely to 
develop. 
 
Donors are sometimes motivated by their own priorities 
and approaches to resource allocation for vector control 
and IRM which are not necessarily aligned with recipient 
FRXQWULHV¶SULRULWLHV7KLVSURElem may occur as the 
international community is seeking to address the 
principal-agent problem where the government is acting 
as the agent for the population).   
Free (donor funded) vector control 
programs which are targeted at specific 
regions or population group (this remedial 
action constitutes another principal-agent 
problem in itself between the donor and 
the recipient government).  
 
Increased research capacity in malaria 
endemic countries to make informed 
technical choices and greater democratic 
accountability within civil society.   
Time-inconsistent 
preferences 
Decisions being made at different points in 
time can be inconsistent with each other.  
This occurs because people can be 
disproportionately attracted to immediately 
available rewards.  When two rewards are 
both substantially delayed, the individual is 
able to make a rational trade-off between 
them.  However, when one reward is 
imminent, it exerts a disproportionate 
attraction. 
IRM: decision-makers are likely to favour achieving high 
intervention coverage with current (cheaper) vector 
control interventions today, and thus unwilling to opt for 
more effective (and considerably more expensive) 
interventions, in order to save additional lives in the 
future.   
Assessment of the costs and benefits of 
decisions over a long time horizon to be 
used to inform public policy.   
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Akin to a vaccination campaign (see Box 1), the 
effect of malaria vector control using 
insecticides can be considered a public good 
and as such bears some positive externalities to 
society as a whole.  Indeed, vector control is 
both non-rival (can be consumed by one user 
without preventing simultaneous consumption 
by another) and non-excludable (non-paying 
consumers cannot be prevented from 
benefitting from it).  While IRS is a public good 
by its nature (the mosquito is killed as it rests on 
WKH ZDOO DIWHUELWLQJDQG WKXVGRHVQ¶W JRRQ WR
transmit an infection it may have picked up from 
that bite), LLINs in particular confer not only 
private but also public benefits, as 
(1) some mosquitos will encounter the 
insecticide and die, and will not go on to 
infect other people; 
and 
(2) insofar as the members of the 
household have fewer cases of malaria, 
when they are bitten by mosquitos in the 
future, these mosquitos will not become 
infected and cannot pass malaria to 
other people. 
Points (1) and (2) above illustrate that vector 
control products also display the classic attributes of a merit good (see also box 1).  ,QGLYLGXDOVGRQ¶W
take into account the benefits to society as a whole (or positive externalities) of being protected through 
a bednet or IRS when making decisions.  
There is also an informational problem, as inhabitants of a household where nets are used have a 
tendency to underestimate the private benefit they obtain from using a net appropriately (they are less 
likely to be bitten by an infectious mosquito and become infected themselves), as they may not fully 
understand either the dynamics of malaria as a disease or the role of insecticides in preventing malaria.  
This is partly but not entirely because of lack of education and public health communication ± but also 
because malaria is a stubborn and complex disease, with a tendency to fight back against control 
efforts. 
Box 1.  A public and a merit good 
Immunization campaigns carry a positive 
externality.  Each person who is vaccinated not 
only reduces their own chance of contracting the 
disease against which s/he has been immunized, 
but also lowers the risk of others in the 
community becoming ill.  However, if vaccination 
campaigns were not publicly funded, individuals 
would not have an incentive to pay a higher price 
for receiving the vaccine which takes into 
account the benefits to society as a whole, nor 
would others in the community have an incentive 
WRFRYHURIWKHFRVWRIWKHLU³VKDUH´RI benefit from 
someone else being vaccinated.  In other words, 
the latter individuals are said to free ride.  The 
effect of vaccination campaign is thus considered 
a public goodEHFDXVHHYHQLILWLV³FRQVXPHG´
E\RQHSHUVRQLWFDQVWLOOEH³FRQVXPHG´E\other 
people, and individuals are not competing for it.  
It is also a merit good because individuals do not 
take into account the benefits to society of being 
immunized.  Partly as a result of inadequate 
information, they may also under-estimate the 
benefit of receiving a vaccination.  In contrast to 
a public good, if I eat an ice-cream, no one else 
can eat it, and the ice-cream is thus a private 
good. 
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While public goods may not be produced at all if markets are left to themselves, merit goods are both 
under-produced and under-consumed in the free market, which forms the basis of the economic 
argument for public investment in malaria vector control.  In other words, limited information about 
benefits, alongside the existence of the public benefits of insecticidal protection, provide the economic 
rationale for public authorities (such as donors or governments) stepping in to provide IRS and ITNs to 
populations living in area of malaria transmission. Global public health authorities have partially 
responded to these challenges with free large-scale distribution campaigns of LLINs and IRS.  More 
recently, UNITAID has supported a subsidy mechanism to attempt to grow the market for a new long 
lasting non-pyrethroid chemical for IRS2.  
Market failure in an era of resistance 
While the implementation of large-scale vector 
control programmes has resulted in a dramatic 
reduction in malaria cases worldwide over the 
last fifteen years, they have also created a major 
public disbenefit, or negative externality (see 
box 2).  Resistance occurs as a result of 
selective pressure on malaria vectors through 
repeated use of single insecticides.  Overuse of 
single insecticides for malaria vector control also 
creates a negative externality in the control of 
other vector borne diseases compromising 
integrated vector management strategies for 
multiple disease control [12].  
Experts agree there is an urgency to reduce the 
use of insecticides (pyrethroid in particular) as 
mono-therapies to reduce this selective pressure on malaria vectors and thus avoid disastrous 
consequences of reaching a tipping point before other active ingredients have been developed.  When 
the new active ingredients reach the market they too need to be protected to avoid rapid emergence of 
resistance.  The risk of insecticide resistance to current and new insecticides would be significantly 
mitigated by deployment of effective IRM strategies.  The question then becomes one of how to make 
this happen in an imperfect market.   
Analogous to vector control, the effect of insecticide resistance management (IRM), is a public and 
merit good where the market exhibits significant failures, the costs and benefits of short or long term 
strategies are borne at different levels as a result of existing externalities.  Any country investing in IRM 
creates a positive externality by reducing the likelihood of resistance spreading locally and in other 
countries.  Yet there is a disincentive for one country to invest in IRM, even if it slows the spread of 
resistance, because while they bear all the costs, not all the benefits will accrue to them.  Thus there is 
                                                          
2
 http://www.ngenirs.org/ 
Box 2.  A negative externality 
When a firm emits pollution into the air, this has a 
negative impact on the environment and on 
people living nearby who are forced to breathe in 
polluted air.  If the same firm were to invest in 
technology which reduces pollution, however, 
everybody in the area would benefit from 
breathing in fresh air, but nobody would be paying 
the firm for its investment.  This gives rise to a 
problem which economists call free riding.  The 
firm has thus no incentive to invest in more 
expensive technology to reduce pollution, unless 
it is incentivized to do so by the government, either 
WKURXJK D VXEVLG\ RU WKURXJK WD[DWLRQ RQ ³GLUW\´
emissions.  
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a global benefit but the costs are borne out of country budgets, also entailing that countries have an 
incentive to free ride when their neighbours are already investing in IRM. 
The rapid rise of resistance has also meant that the need to incentivize R&D in the field of vector control 
has become more pressing.  The fact that it has been developing so fast and the existence of a potential 
tipping point has meant that rapid progress is necessary in approving new ingredients for use as public 
health insecticides in vector control, before all the gains achieved to date are lost. 
However, due to their nature as a public and merit good, there is also a lack of knowledge and research 
for vector control products.  The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that people in need of these 
products are relatively poor and therefore only able to pay a low price for them.  Limited demand, high 
R&D costs and the high risks involved  mean that firms have limited incentive to invest in them, thus 
the need for public intervention.  Publicly funded initiatives such as IVCC have been instrumental in 
promoting effective collaboration amongst experts in the development of new active ingredients.  
However, despite these efforts to stimulate R&D for new insecticides, limited action has been taken to 
encourage pro-active resistance management as an immediate measure, stimulate the demand for new 
Active Ingredients (AIs), and to protect future effectiveness of new AIs currently being developed.  
Another important market failure that occurs in the field of vector control and has been exacerbated by 
the occurrence of resistance is a fundamental economic challenge known as the principal-agent 
problem, which often occurs partially as a result of information asymmetry.  Within a country, while 
policy makers (the agent) have more and better information on the benefits of vector control and 
managing resistance than the population (the principal), their respective incentives may not always be 
aligned.  In SDUWLFXODUSROLF\PDNHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVWRDFKLHYHKLJKOHYHOVRIFRYHUDJHLQRUGHUWREHVHHQ
to protect large proportions of the population) may not always ensure that the poorest or most at risk 
populations are adequately taken care of.  While both IRS and ITN programmes will be more costly for 
more remote populations, targeted ITN distribution programmes (for example for pregnant women or 
children under five) may also be more expensive if they require that more than one net per targeted 
individual to be distributed, in order to reflect the fact that other members of the family will also be using 
nets [7].  This in turn raises some important questions around how to ensure equity is taken into account 
when governments have to operate under constrained budgets.   
,URQLFDOO\ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶V DWWHPSW WR DGGUHVV WKH DERYH FKDOOHQJHs may give rise to 
further issues, where international donors act as agents for developing country governments (the 
principal).  In particular, issues are likely to arise when donors fund and manage a series of vector 
control projects in recipient countries, over which they have almost complete control and primarily reflect 
donor country priorities.  At the same time, while value-for-money may present a useful framework for 
priority-setting where resources are limited, there may also be some unintended negative 
consequences.  For example, the UK government recommends that funding should be prioritised for 
settings where coverage rates are still relatively low and malaria mortality remains high [15], in order to 
maximize the health benefits achieved.  While this makes sense from a purely economic perspective, 
it is also the case that additional resources will be necessary to manage resistance in those countries 
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which have already reached high levels of coverage and reduction in malaria mortality, in order to avoid 
the potentially catastrophic consequences of resistance to insecticides developing at a faster rate and 
spreading across territories.    
Closely related to the principal-agent problem in the area of IRM in particular, is the fact that decision 
makers often have time-inconsistent 
preferences (see box 3) [16, 17].  While the 
extent to which this phenomenon occurs will be 
dependent on the discount rate the 
consequences for malaria control and elimination 
are severe, as actions that should be taken today 
are unduly delayed.  Decision makers operate 
under a certain degree of political and economic 
pressure from their own population as well as 
international donors, and they are aware that 
their career as a policy maker may be short-lived 
and highly dependent on immediate results.  
Given a constrained budget, the choice to reduce 
coverage today in order to increase effectiveness 
and eventually save additional lives in the future 
is near impossible for decision makers on the 
grounds, as this is likely to cost lives in the short 
run.  Furthermore, reducing coverage in order to 
choose more effective interventions would mean 
that coverage targets set by the international 
community would not be met, thus potentiall\ DIIHFWLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ DELOLW\ WR DFFHVV IXUWKHU IXQGV WR
combat malaria. 
5. Conclusion and recommendations 
There is clear global recognition that insecticide resistance represents a major source of concern for 
the sustainability of current malaria control programmes.  Major advances have been made and it would 
be tragic if the gains which have been made in the last 10-15 years were lost, particularly given malaria 
eradication is back on the global health agenda.  Development partners continue to demonstrate a 
strong commitment towards malaria control and eradication efforts.  The UK and the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation recently announced US$4.28 billion in funding over the next five years for research 
and to support efforts to eliminate this disease [18]. 
In order to ensure that these and further investments in malaria control and eradication achieve the 
greatest value-for-money impact, we argue that a framework is necessary which can help countries¶ to 
strike the balance between advancing towards universal coverage and taking actions to protect already 
won gains by increases in insecticide resistance, while also looking towards malaria eradication.  Such 
Box 3.  Time-inconsistent preferences 
Thinking about the following question: 
(a)  Which do you prefer, be given 10 pounds 
today or 12 pounds tomorrow? 
(b)  Which do you prefer, be given 10 pounds 
365 days later or 12 pounds 366 days later? 
When this question is asked, to be time-
consistent, people must choose "12 pounds 
tomorrow" for question (a) and "12 pounds 366 
days later" for question (b).  However, people are 
not always consistent, and tend to choose "10 
pounds today" and "12 pounds 366 days later", 
which is different from the time-consistent 
answer.  This occurs because people may be 
disproportionately attracted to short term 
rewards. 
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a framework would also help donors identify how best to allocate funds in order to maximize benefits 
and look at ways in which to ensure sustained financing.  While many of the elements of this framework 
will necessarily draw on medical and entomological science, we focus on the key economic ideas which 
must underpin such a framework.  We propose four main steps towards the creation of this framework. 
1. Explicitly consider trade-offs that arise from resource allocation decisions in malaria 
vector control, particularly those forced by resistance.  Such trade-offs have the potential 
to be politically contentious, and include coverage-efficacy as well as time trade-offs illustrated 
in section two above.  They also include the need to balance equity versus efficiency, closely 
linked to the discussion on market failure arising from information asymmetries and lack of 
information.  
 
2. Further develop and promote the use of resource allocation tools for vector control that 
systematically take account of resistance in different settings.  In order to do so, further 
modelling of insecticide resistance (analogous to work which has been done for drug 
resistance) is necessary, that seek to trace the path that resistance is likely to take over the 
next few years in different settings.  As has already been highlighted elsewhere [12], more 
detailed financial data on insecticide resistance management as well as new tools (including 
those currently in the development pipeline) are necessary to ensure the analysis is 
comprehensive.  This will enable policy makers in developing countries to access information 
on a comprehensive set of available options for combating malaria in an era of resistance, and 
thus not only facilitate the resource allocation process, but also aid the achievement of a fair 
price setting mechanisms for manufacturers.  
 
3. Urgently address the global challenge posed by the effect of insecticide resistance 
management displaying attributes of a public and a merit good.  We argue that this factor 
alone presents a strong economic basis for a global, multi-sectoral intervention to tackle 
insecticide resistance.  We also suggest that because of the informational problems in 
assessing the impact of resistance, countries and donors have significantly under-prioritised 
investing in guarding against insecticide resistance within their malaria control investment 
portfolios.  While efforts have been made to stimulate the supply of innovative tools for vector 
control, limited action has been taken to generate the necessary additional demand for these 
products.  We therefore suggest that further work is undertaken on the creation of potentially 
new innovative financing tools for vector control products.  We also propose that in-depth global 
level analysis be undertaken on the value of susceptibility to insecticides used for vector control 
and the importance of preserving it, drawing from the work already undertaken in the field of 
anti-malarial drugs where relevant and appropriate [19, 20].  
 
4. Ensure that existing market failures in malaria vector control in an era of resistance are 
systematically taken into account in value-for-money analyses and corresponding 
resource allocation decisions.  This recommendation closely ties in with recommendation 2 
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and calls for a more comprehensive and flexible approach to resource allocation in malaria 
vector control.  We suggest this would encourage policy makers to systematically consider a 
range of factors which may be more difficult not only to quantify in financial terms but also to 
justify politically, but also facilitate the design of adequate solutions to address specific market 
failures in varying contexts. 
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Annex One ± Glossary of Terms 
(i) Health and malaria terms 
Combination LLINs: bednets with two or more active ingredients.  
Disease-Adjusted Life Year (DALY): A measure of overall disease burden, expressed as the number 
of years lost due to ill-health, disability or early death. 
Indoor residual spraying (IRS): The process of spraying the inside of dwellings with an insecticide to 
target indoor biting mosquitoes that spread malaria.  Susceptible mosquitoes are killed when they come 
into contact with the insecticide.  
Insecticide-treated net (ITN): A net (usually a bed net), designed to block mosquitoes physically, that 
has been treated with safe, residual insecticide for the purpose of killing mosquitoes, which carry 
malaria.  To-date, only one insecticide class, the pyrethroids, has been approved for this purpose on 
bednets. 
Long-lasting Insecticide-treated nets (LLIN): An ITN with pyrethroid insecticides incorporated into its 
fibre and designed to remain effective against susceptible mosquitoes for multiple years without 
retreatment (usually about three years). 
Malaria vector: In epidemiology, a vector is any agent (person, animal, or microorganism) that carries 
and transmits an infectious pathogen into another living organism.  Mosquitos are a vector for several 
diseases, most notably malaria. 
Tipping point: the point at which a series of small changes or incidents becomes significant enough to 
cause a larger, more important change.  ,QWKHFDVHRIUHVLVWDQFHWRSXEOLFKHDOWKLQVHFWLFLGHVD³WLSSLQJ
SRLQW´GHVFULEHVWKHIDFWWKDWUHVLVWDQFHFDQRFFXUDWORZEXWJUDGXDOO\LQFUHDVLQJIUHTXHQF\LQWKHYHFWRU
population for many years without being detected.  :KHQ D ³WLSSLQJ SRLQW´ LV UHDFKHG KRZHYHU
resistance may increase extremely rapidly and becomes detectable within a population, thus becoming 
operationally significant for malaria control programmes and potentially leading to control failure.  
 
(ii) Economic terms 
Externality: A cost or benefit arising from an activity which does not accrue to the person or 
organization carrying out the activity.  
Free riding: When a person or organization benefits from a public good, but neither provides it nor 
contributes to the cost of collective provision.  They thus free ride on the efforts of others. 
Incomplete markets: Markets may fail to produce enough merit goods (see below), such as education 
and healthcare.  
Information asymmetry: A situation where one party has more or better information than the other.  
This creates an imbalance of power in transactions, and may result in individuals making choices which 
are neither in their best interests, nor that of society.  
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Market failure: describes a situation where markets, when left to themselves, are not successful at 
allocating resources efficiently, and hence an intervention by an external party, such as government or 
other institution may be warranted.  
Merit goods: A good which would be under-consumed (and under-produced) in the free market 
economy, as its consumption generates a positive externality.  As a result, the public benefit of 
consuming a merit good is greater than the private benefit of doing so.  As consumers only take into 
account private benefits when consuming merit goods, they are under-consumed (and so under-
produced).  In addition, individuals do not tend to taking into account the long term benefits of consuming 
a merit good and so they are under-consumed. 
Missing market: Occurs when markets may fail to form, resulting in a failure to meet a need or want, 
such as the need for public goods.  
Principal-Agent problem: Arises where the two parties have different interests and asymmetric 
information (the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the 
agent is always acting in its (the principal's) best interests, particularly when activities that are useful to 
the principal are costly to the agent, and where elements of what the agent does are costly for the 
principal to observe. 
Public goods: Goods or services which, if they are provided at all, are open to use by all members of 
society.  As such, they are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in that individuals cannot be effectively 
excluded from use and where use by one individual does not reduce availability to others.  As nobody 
can be excluded from using them, public goods cannot be provided for private profit.  
Return on investment: The benefit to the investor resulting from an investment of some resource.  A 
high ROI means the investment gains compare favorably to investment cost. 
Time-inconsistent preferences: Decisions being made at different points in time can be inconsistent 
with each other.  In particular, when particular rewards are imminent, they exert a disproportionate 
attraction.  
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